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For I say to you in all sadness of conviction that to think great thoughts 
you must be heroes as well as idealists.  Only when you have worked 
alone—when you have felt around you a black gulf of solitude more 
isolating than that which surrounds the dying man, and in hope and in 
despair have trusted to your own unshaken will—then only will you have 
achieved.  Thus only can you gain the secret isolated joy of the thinker, 
who knows that, a hundred years after he is dead and forgotten, men who 
never heard of him will be moving to the measure of his thought. 
MR. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.2 
                                                                
1Associate, Sidley & Austin.  J.D., University of Chicago, 2000; M.Acct. Southern Illinois 
University at Carbondale, 1993; B.S. Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1992; CPA, 
1992.  This article has benefited greatly from the comments and (mostly constructive) 
criticism of a number of individuals.  I would like in particular to acknowledge my sincere 
debt to Chris Connors, David P. Currie, Brian Horan, Bill Hughes, Richard Johnson, Shawn 
Mazander, Nathan Neff, Mark Palermo, Bob Rubenstein, T. Jason White, Kenneth Weiner, 
and, of course, my wife, Janice, who witnessed (and experienced) the anguish that went into 
writing this article.  Thank you! 
2RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, 
JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 220 (1996) 
(from a lecture delivered to the undergraduates of Harvard University on February 17, 1886).  
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Meet Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  “He is philosopher become king.”3  
Seventy-five years ago, he plotted a constitutional path that, while crooked, most 
contemporary jurists have been willing to travel—at least partially.  He accepted a 
restrictive notion of economic freedoms, such as freedom of contract,4 but later 
rejected a restrictive notion of non-economic freedoms, such as freedom of speech.5  
This path is not only crooked.  It is also paradoxical:  citizens are free to say what 
they want, but the States—the political institutions best able to listen—are powerless 
to act if the federal government has enacted what it believes is a better idea.  That 
may be the end-result, but only if that is the end of the path.  As the Supreme Court 
has only recently begun to realize, however, it is not. 
This article analyzes the last turn in Justice Holmes’s constitutionally crooked 
path, largely by penetrating to the very core of the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Alden v. Maine.6  In this case, the Court upheld the Maine State courts’ dismissal 
of a federal private right of action against a non-consenting State, the Supremacy 
Clause itself notwithstanding.  Alden resolves, albeit only partially, a fundamental 
issue that strikes at the heart of our coordinate system of government: whether a non-
consenting State is absolutely immune from suit in any state court if the right of 
action arises under a federal law that is properly within the constitutional ambit of 
Congress’s regulatory authority.  It is hard to believe that this basic issue has been 
lying in wait for more than 200 years, but it has, and so it is not surprising that this 
case unearths some of the weightiest issues federalism and federal jurisdiction have 
to offer.  It necessitates a theory of the Tenth Amendment that accords with the 
Supremacy Clause; it questions the outer jurisdictional limits of our legislative 
courts; and it casts considerable doubt on the obligatory nature of concurrent state 
court jurisdiction.  
Unfortunately, the Alden decision is woefully inadequate, as it offers virtually no 
guidance in dealing with these issues.7  So by analyzing and reconciling these issues, 
this article hopefully fills the void, for deep below the surface there is, indeed, a 
cohesive and consistent theory of federalism:  the Commerce Clause gives Congress 
the power to regulate the inner-workings of the States, but the Tenth Amendment 
evidences the States the exclusive power to regulate the jurisdiction of their own 
courts.  Put more broadly, Congress can regulate the States to practically no end, but 
if Congress believes its laws are economically sound, then it must incur the judicial 
and, at times, prosecutorial resources to enforce them, or persuade (but not coerce) 
the state legislatures to do the same. 
                                                                
3PHILIP B. KURLAND, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL 
ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 122 (1970). 
4See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-75 (1905) (Holmes J., dissenting). 
5See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes J., dissenting). 
6Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
7Commentators, moreover, are equally perplexed. See, e.g., The Supreme Court: Foot on 
Brake, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22-28, 2000, at 32 (quoting Professor Douglas Kmiec: the 
Justices “know what direction they want to go in, but I don’t think they yet have a theory to 
guide them.”).  If the Supreme Court has not yet found this guiding theory, if nothing else, this 
article surely offers one.  
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/5
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This is Justice Holmes’s “jurisdictional stopgap.”  But to fully appreciate its 
vigor requires a much fuller understanding of the road that has been traveled thus far.  
So with that end in mind, our first stop is the Commerce Clause.  A judicial forum, 
after all, is but an empty plate if the claim against the State is itself unconstitutional.  
Part I therefore traces the Court’s waffling attitude towards the division of regulatory 
power between the state and federal governments.  Then, against this backdrop, Part 
II takes the jurisdictional turn by analyzing the Court’s most recent attempt to 
resuscitate the Tenth Amendment’s check on Congress’s Commerce Power.  To 
sharpen the focus, much of this article will focus on the Fair Labor Standards Act, a 
federal statute that always seems to sit at the center of the Court’s federalism storm.  
I.  CONGRESS’S (IN)ABILITY TO REGULATE THE STATES’ INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
No one can argue that the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA]8 does not best 
exemplify the Court’s near-schizophrenic attitude towards the division of power 
between the federal and state governments.  For not only is the FLSA a by-product 
of the “switch in time” that supposedly “saved the Nine,” but its divisive antecedents 
and its rich history summon most of the issues and arguments that have persisted to 
today.  
A.  Before the New Deal 
In 1916, for example,9 Congress passed the federal Child Labor Act, which 
prohibited the interstate or foreign transportation of certain products.  Two years 
later, in a five-to-four decision, the Court struck this law down in Hammer v. 
Dagenhart.10  The thrust of the Court’s disagreement turned on the Tenth 
Amendment’s check on Congress’s regulative power.  Does the Tenth Amendment 
impose a limitation on Congress’s expressly11 enumerated powers just as the First 
                                                                
8See 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. 
9For just a sampling of decisions that have considered the constitutionality of Congress’s 
authority to regulate distinct segments of the labor force, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. ICC, 
221 U.S. 612 (1911) (prohibiting a maximum number of hours in the interstate railway 
industry); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating 
the NIRA’s “Live Poultry Code”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) 
(invalidating the NIRA’s Petroleum Code). 
10Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
11During the first session of Congress, Representative Tucker proposed that the States 
retain all of the powers not “expressly” delegated to the federal government, so that the Tenth 
Amendment would read “the powers not expressly delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution,” (emphasis added) but the federalist controlled Congress rejected this proposal 
stating that such a limitation “was one of the great defects” of the Articles of Confederation. 
See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 1900-
01, 752-54 (1833); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD 1789-1801 112 n.443 (1997).  Despite this clear refutation, however, the majority 
opinion in Hammer slipped the word “expressly” into its reiteration of the Tenth Amendment, 
as did the authority upon which it relied: “[T]he powers not expressly delegated to the national 
government are reserved.” (emphasis added) (citing Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
71, 76 (1868), which noted that the States retain “all powers not expressly delegated to the 
national government.”) (emphasis added).  
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
500 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:497 
Amendment does and, if so, to what extent?  Or is the Tenth Amendment merely a 
tautology? 
The majority favored the former interpretation, and Justice Holmes dissented in 
favor of the latter.  First, the majority distinguished a number of prior decisions that 
upheld a number of federal regulatory statutes on the ground that those statutes, 
unlike the Child Labor Act, attacked an inherently evil activity or product.12  While 
employing children under certain circumstances is no doubt evil, the degree to which 
such employment is prohibited is arguably not.  All of the States had already 
regulated this purely local activity.  Thus, prohibiting the transportation of those 
products that failed to comply with these more exacting federal requirements, the 
Court held, was tantamount to “requir[ing] the states to exercise their police 
power.”13  Although the state and federal laws clashed with one another, the Court 
nonetheless did not believe that the Supremacy Clause should prevail.  This is 
because the States’ enactment of  “such laws as seem wise to the local authority is 
inherent and has never been surrendered to the general government.”14  Thus the 
Court invalidated the Child Labor Act, holding that it unconstitutionally impinged 
the States’ regulatory prerogative. 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Holmes agreed that the state legislatures retained 
the authority to regulate the working conditions of the labor force, but he disagreed 
with the majority’s conclusion that Congress’s exclusive authority over interstate 
commerce could not indirectly alter those laws.15  In other words, the federal 
judiciary could not prohibit Congress from accomplishing indirectly what it could 
not accomplish directly.  Any relief, he argued, is only available if “placed there by 
congressional action.”16  Consider Standard Oil v. United States,17 where the Court 
upheld the use of the Commerce Clause to break up monopolies, even though the 
Sherman Act indirectly interfered with the States’ exclusive control over their 
intrastate manufacturing activities.18  So in Justice Holmes’s mind, the collateral 
effect the Commerce Clause has on the Tenth Amendment is a necessary 
consequence of the application of the Supremacy Clause; and the availability of any 
relief from this result necessarily redounds to the national political process.  
                                                                
12So that no one could misunderstand why these prior decisions were distinguishable, the 
Court quoted its reasoning for upholding the Mann Act in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 
(1913):  
If the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of 
lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or 
persons, the impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the 
systematic enticement to, and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of 
women, and, more insistently, of girls. 
Id. at 322. 
13Id. at 276.  
14Id. at 275. 
15Id. at 277. 
16Hoke, 227 U.S. at 280 (quoting Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108 (1890)). 
17221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1912). 
18See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 279. 
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The essence of the Court’s disagreement, then, boiled down to whether the Tenth 
Amendment (or the Constitution as a whole) implicitly embodies any core regulatory 
activities that are wholly immune from federal intrusion, not whether the States had 
already regulated those activities.  If the unconstitutionality of a federal statute 
depended on the existence of an overlapping state statute, the Tenth Amendment 
would essentially embody a reverse Supremacy Clause.  That is, Congress could 
indirectly regulate purely local matters only so long as the state legislatures had not.  
While this wild animal may sound perverse, the majority actually took it one step 
further, holding that the Tenth Amendment embodies something of a reverse 
negative Commerce Clause.19 
Just two months after the Hammer decision, Congress tried again.  This time it 
enacted the Child Labor Tax Law of 1919,20 which, as its name gives away, taxed the 
profits generated from the use of this purportedly evil activity; otherwise it was 
essentially identical to the Child Labor Act of 1916.  It never stood a chance.  We 
would have “to be blind,” the Court blistered, “not to see that the so-called tax [was] 
imposed to stop the employment of children.”21 
During the next term, however, the Court encouraged Congress to take a different 
path, one that has proved to this day virtually impervious to constitutional attack.  In 
Massachusetts v. Mellon,22 the State of Massachusetts argued that the federal 
Maternity Act, which provided the States with federal grants so long as they 
complied with the statute’s mandate, violated the Tenth Amendment because it 
induced the States into ceding a portion of their sovereignty over to the federal 
government.  Not true, this statute, the Court held, did not “require the states to do, 
or to yield anything,” it merely gave them the option to do so.23  So even if this 
statute violated the Constitution, since it did not actually or potentially invade the 
States’ sovereignty, the States had no standing; and without standing, the outcome 
again depended on the national political process.24 
B.  During and After the New Deal 
The foregoing negative “activism” incensed President Franklin D. Roosevelt.  In 
a radio address on March 9, 1937, he announced that his court-packing plan was 
necessary to “save our National Constitution from hardening of the judicial 
arteries.”25  Coincidentally(?), just three weeks later the Court abandoned its 
interventionist course; and for the next 34 years, deference to congressional 
                                                                
19Though alien to contemporary ideology, it does appear that the majority floated such an 
idea: “The maintenance of the authority of the States over matters purely local is as essential 
to the preservation of our institutions as is the conservation of the supremacy of the federal 
power in all matters entrusted to the nation by the federal Constitution.”  Id. at 275. 
20See Tax on Employment of Child Labor of 1919, 40 Stat. 1057, 1138 (1919), amended 
by Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, 306 (Title XII 1921). 
21Bailey v. Drexel, 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922). 
22Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
23Id. at 482. 
24Id. at 489.  
25GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129-30 (11th ed. 1985).  
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intrusions reigned supreme.26  Congress seized this opportunity by enacting the 
FLSA in 1938, which, as then worded, only applied to private employers.  The 
following year,27 Justice Holmes’s “powerful and now classic dissent”28 in Hammer 
gained currency and ultimately won sway with the Court in 1941. 
In United States v. Darby,29 Justice Stone delivered the unanimous Court’s 
requiem for the Tenth Amendment, first putting to rest any idea of a reverse 
Supremacy Clause, and then interpreting the Tenth Amendment out of existence.  
Just because the Commerce Clause may preclude a State’s regulation of an interstate 
activity, even if Congress has not regulated that activity,30 the Court held, does not 
mean that Congress can not regulate an intrastate activity on a subject a State has 
already regulated, so long as the federal regulation substantially affects interstate 
commerce. Of course the Commerce Clause has its limits, the Court continued, but 
only to the extent the Constitution specifically and substantively provides.31  As for 
the Tenth Amendment, it provides nothing, for it merely reaffirms that which the 
enumeration of powers implies—namely, that those powers which are not conferred 
are retained.  The Tenth Amendment is therefore “but a truism.”32  Thus, Congress 
                                                                
26See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. 
Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and upholding a state minimum wage law for women).  
It may be perilous to assume that President Roosevelt intimidated the Court into submission, 
for Justice Roberts voted on December 19, 1936, well before President Roosevelt even 
announced his court-packing plan.  See PHILIP B. KURLAND, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE 
SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 518 (1970) 
(“It is one of the most ludicrous illustrations of the power of lazy repetition of uncritical talk 
that a judge with the character of Roberts should have attributed to him a change of judicial 
views out of deference to political considerations.”); but see Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told 
Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620 (1994) (arguing that Justice Frankfurter actually 
rewrote the history of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan in order to lessen the incessant scrutiny 
that was being leveled against the Court’s holding in Brown v. Bd. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954)). 
27See, e.g., Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47 (1939) (citing the authority weakly 
distinguished in Hammer, the Court held that Congress may regulate the interstate commerce 
of intrastate activities to the vanishing point). 
28United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941). 
29See id. 
30Even the vitality of this so-called “negative” or “dormant” Commerce Clause has 
recently been put into play. See Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 78-79 
(1993) (Scalia J., concurring) (“[T]he Commerce Clause contains no ‘negative’ component, no 
self-operative prohibition upon the States’ regulation of commerce,” though prior precedents 
may still be upheld). 
31Id. at 116. 
32Id. at 124.  Whether the Tenth Amendment is a truism, or even a tautology, see New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992), depends on your view of the foundation 
of the constitutional plan.  Surely you cannot both give and retain the same power, but the 
Tenth Amendment does not explicitly say who gave the power in the first place.  If the people 
were the parties to this “new” Constitution, then the Tenth Amendment actually “reserved to 
the States” the powers the people did not reserve to themselves or delegate to the federal 
government.  Under this assumption of the constitutional plan, the Tenth Amendment is not a 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/5
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may prescribe a national minimum wage because labor conditions substantially 
affect interstate commerce;33 and since Congress can constitutionally impose this 
primary obligation, the Court further held that it can likewise impose any such 
“incidental . . . means of enforcing” it.34  
No doubt emboldened by the Court’s considerable deference, Congress further 
extended the FLSA’s coverage, first to employees of public schools and hospitals in 
1966, and then to virtually all state governmental employees in 1974.35  In Maryland 
v. Wirtz,36 twenty-eight States joined together in attacking the 1966 amendments, 
arguing that its constitutionality would usher in “the utter destruction of the state[s] 
as . . . sovereign political entit[ies].” 37  But such an apocalyptic prediction, the Court 
chimed, is simply not tenable.  The FLSA does not “tell the States how to perform 
[their] medical and educational functions,” it just tells them the minimum amount 
such services is worth.38  Since a public hospital or a school’s activities obviously 
affect interstate commerce, the Court found no justification for distinguishing 
between a State’s governmental and proprietary functions and thus upheld the 1966 
amendment.39 
Congress’s victory in Wirtz, however, turned to defeat in National League of 
Cities v. Usery.40  Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion for a rancorously 
divided Court.  It is one thing, the Court held, for Congress to regulate the maximum 
hours and minimum dollars that a private employer can pay its employees, but it is 
quite another thing to impose those same restrictions on a state employer.41  Unlike 
                                                          
redundancy, because it does not say that the States retained those powers they did not give to 
the federal government.  
33To just briefly veer down a policy lane, the States, not the federal government, are 
plainly in a better position to determine what impact a minimum wage will have on the widely 
varying commercial communities within their borders.  Perhaps these experimental 
“laboratories” might even discover that the problem is actually in the medicine the federal 
government prescribes. See New State Ice. Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis J., dissenting) (advancing the idea that the States should operate as “laboratories” of 
trial and error). 
34Darby, 312 U.S. at 124-25. 
35A narrow band of employees remain exempt.  Section 213(a)(1) excepts, for example, 
professional employees from the FLSA’s overtime provisions.  And it is this professional 
employee exclusion that precipitated the Court’s decision in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999).  See Part II, infra. 
36Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
37Id. at 196. 
38Id. at 193-94.  The three-headed district court that initially heard this case exposed the 
obvious weakness in this argument.  See Maryland v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 849 (Md. 1967) 
(pointing out that the power to regulate can be just as destructive as the power to tax). 
39Seemingly troubled by the potentially crippling effect this decision could have on the 
States’ autonomy, the Court took the unusual step of reserving judgment on a related Eleventh 
Amendment issue.  See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 200.  
40National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
41Id. at 845. 
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the private sector, the States constitute a coordinate part of our constitutional system 
of government.42  The Tenth Amendment, though it has been characterized as a 
truism, is none the less an “express”43 declaration of “the constitutional policy that 
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or 
their ability to function effectively in a federal system.”44  
The Court then held that both the 1966 and the 1974 amendments to the FLSA 
impose significant burdens on the States, displace their policy-making decisions and 
thereby “have the effect of coercing the States” into relinquishing, taxing, or at least 
reducing their “traditional governmental functions,” such as police and fire 
protection.45  In so holding, the Court overruled Wirtz but left intact Darby and the 
long line of decisions upholding Congress’s plenary power to regulate private 
interstate and foreign commerce. 
Justice Brennan’s stinging dissent resonated with so much enmity that, at times, 
it practically defied credibility.  He roundly condemned the majority for 
manufacturing an “abstraction without substance,”46 and one that will surely 
“astound scholars of the Constitution,”47 because it is entirely devoid of 
constitutional support—either from the text of the Constitution or from the Court’s 
150+ years of precedent.  It was this “overly restrictive” view of the Commerce 
Clause, he reminded the majority, that not only provoked the “constitutional crisis” 
of the 1930s, but also nearly destroyed the institutional integrity of the judicial 
branch.48  The dissent then went on to extol the virtues of the national political 
process, arguing that the States are adequately represented at the national level, and 
that the political process is therefore the only effective means of safeguarding the 
States’ sovereignty.49  Anything more, the dissent concluded, is nothing less than a 
“catastrophic judicial body blow [to] Congress’ power under the Commerce 
Clause.”50 
                                                                
42Id. at 848-49. 
43That the Tenth Amendment expressly declares a “policy” that restricts the Commerce 
Clause is but a roundabout way of saying the Tenth Amendment itself “expressly” restricts the 
Commerce Clause.  Yet, in the prior term, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Tenth 
Amendment did not restrict the Commerce Clause “by its terms.”  See Fry v. United States, 
421 U.S. 542, 557 (1975); see also William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 
54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976) (approving Justice Holmes’s opinion in Missouri v. Holland, 
252 U.S. 416 (1920)). 
44Usery, 426 U.S. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). 
45Id. at 850, 852. 
46Id. at 860. 
47Id. at 862. 
48Id. at 868. 
49Usery, 426 U.S. at 857, 876; see also Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
50Usery, 426 U.S. at 880.  Despite the dissent’s polemic, it nonetheless acknowledged that 
Congress could readily achieve its objectives through the use of conditional grants; and in so 
saying, it conceded the limited practical effect the majority’s holding would actually have on 
the division of power.  Id. at 878.   
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/5
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It is far from clear why the Court overruled Wirtz but not Darby.  The majority 
tried to reconcile these two cases by pointing to an unavailing, question-begging 
distinction:  “A State is not merely a factor in the ‘shifting economic arrangements’ 
of the private sector of the economy, . . . but is itself a coordinate element in the 
system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Union.”51  While this 
distinction is undeniably true, it fails to explain why, on the one hand, the federal 
government can displace the States’ ability to regulate the private sector, but, on the 
other hand, it cannot displace the States’ ability to regulate certain “traditional 
governmental functions.”  After all, if the Constitution protects certain core 
activities, then would one not expect to find the legislative function—a (if not the) 
quintessential function of a State’s sovereignty—at the top of the list?  Hospitals, fire 
fighters, sanitation, public health, and all of the other functions the Court pegged to 
the “essentials” of state sovereignty can be carried out by the private sector, but the 
States’ legislative function cannot.  What can be more “essential” to the States’ 
sovereignty than those very functions the private sector cannot perform?   
Because of these difficulties, as well as the elusive nature of this essential-
function test, the demise of National League of Cities seemed almost inevitable.  
After a series of decisions that refined but consistently rejected the applicability of 
this essential-function test,52 the Court finally gave up in 1985 and overruled 
National League of Cities.  In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority,53 the Court was asked to consider whether a municipally-owned mass 
transit system constituted a traditional governmental function, and was thereby 
immune from the FLSA’s mandate.  Justice Blackmun, writing for the five member 
majority, four of whom dissented in National League of Cities, concluded that such 
an inquiry is bankrupt: it is “unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.”54  
States are sovereign to the extent their powers are not vested in the federal 
government, but the Tenth Amendment, the Court then believed, “offers no guidance 
about where the frontier between state and federal power lies.”55  Thus relying on 
Professor Wechsler’s seminal work on judicial review,56 the Court held that the 
States’ primary protection from federal interference resides in the political process. 
The dissent denounced the majority’s wholesale abandonment of the Court’s 
unique role in determining the constitutional status of the States’ sovereignty.  The 
majority offers no explanation, the dissent argued, why the principles of the Court’s 
most famous case, Marbury v. Madison, are somehow no longer applicable to the 
                                                                
51Id. at 849.  
52See, e.g., Holdel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) 
(reformulating National League of Cities into a three-part test); United Transportation Union 
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (rejecting a state autonomy challenge to the 
Railway Labor Act); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (rejecting a state autonomy 
challenge to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act). 
53Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Hous. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
54Id. at 546. 
55Id. at 550. 
56See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 542 (1954). 
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Court’s role in supervising Congress’s regulation of the States.57  The dissent also 
objected to the majority’s statement that the States would retain some degree of 
sovereignty.  It lacks credibility, the dissent asserted, because the majority has not 
indicated a single aspect of the States’ sovereignty that “would remain when the 
Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal regulation.”58  Indeed, by overruling 
National League of Cities and reaffirming Wirtz, “all that stands between the 
remaining essentials of state sovereignty and Congress” Justice O’Connor 
concluded, “is the latter’s underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint.”59  Finally, 
Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor confidently predicted that the constitutional status 
of federalism would “in time again command the support of a majority of this 
Court.”60  How prophetic indeed! 
II.  THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY JURISDICTIONAL STOPGAP 
A.  Charting the Course 
Justice Brennan’s resignation in the summer of 1990—if not Justice Rehnquist’s 
elevation to the Chief Justice post in 1986—signaled yet another shift in the Court’s 
ever-elusive conception of constitutional federalism.61  This time, however, in 
contrast to National League of Cities v. Usery,62 the Court gradually yet 
systematically reconstructed a protective sphere of state autonomy.  Indeed, what 
started out as a distant rumble, a mere prediction,63 has recently materialized into a 
variegated attack on Congress’s ability to regulate State activities.  
At first, the Court moved with some degree of caution, adopting what Professor 
Shapiro has called a “sub-constitutional”64 insistence on congressional 
accountability:  States cannot fend for themselves in the national political process if 
                                                                
57469 U.S. 557 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
58Id. at 581. 
59Id. at 588. 
60Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
61A similar shift in ideology has occurred in both the Executive and Legislative branches.  
In 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), and in 
1995, Congress enacted the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., both of 
which evince a heightened concern for state autonomy.  Executive Order 12,866 requires  
federal agencies to consult with state officials before promulgating any regulations that may 
affect the States’ autonomy; and the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act restricts Congress’s 
ability to regulate certain federally assisted state activities.  
62426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
63See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580, 589; William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National 
Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships 78 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1992) 
(“Circumstances have changed, and the nation can no longer afford the luxury of state and 
federal systems that work at cross-purposes or that irrationally duplicate each others’ 
efforts.”).  
64See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 64, 71, 118 (1995). 
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the magnitude of the federal intrusion is not readily apparent.65  So now before 
Congress can legislate away the States’ autonomy, its intention to do so must be 
perfectly plain.  This substantive cannon of construction,66 ingeniously linked to the 
Court’s justification for overruling National League of Cities, was then aggressively 
employed in strengthening the States’ interests under the Tenth, Eleventh, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  However, the Court did not truly turn the corner until its 
landmark decision in New York v. United States.67  There, for the first time since 
1976, the Court severed and then struck down a portion of a federal statute, 
ironically on the ground that it coerced the state legislature, and thereby infringed the 
state political process.68   
Caution gave way in 1995, and with it, the Supreme Court has since overthrown 
a number of intrusive federal statutes with almost annual regularity.  In United States 
v. Lopez,69 the Court awoke from its dogmatic slumber, and, for the first time in 
nearly sixty years,70 struck down a federal statute that regulated a private activity 
under the Commerce Clause.  In 1996, Seminole Tribe of Fla v. Florida71 put a 
partial end to Congress’s ability under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the States’ 
sovereign immunity in federal court, thereby channeling future congressional 
incursions into the civil war amendments.  And in 1997, the Court extended and 
strengthened its holding in New York by invalidating yet another federal statute, this 
time on the ground that it compelled state officials to implement and enforce a 
federal regulatory scheme.72  
Largely untouched during this state sovereignty spree was the seminal decision of 
Testa v. Katt,73 where the Court seemingly held the state judiciary has an obligation 
to adjudicate concurrent federal question claims.  Few questioned Testa’s continuing 
viability—few, that is, until now.  
B.  The Jurisdictional Turn 
So the Court’s latest reformulation of federalism began well before Seminole 
Tribe, but the Court’s logical and, indeed, sensible holding in Alden v. Maine has 
                                                                
65See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (refusing to subject a State to suit in 
federal court unless the statute plainly shows a congressional intent to do so); Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that a State’s mandatory retirement requirement 
applies to state appointed judges because the ADEA does not expressly prohibit it). 
66See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 405 (1989). 
67505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
68See id. at 168-69.  This is ironic because, until 1992, the last decision that invalidated a 
federal statute was itself invalidated in 1985; and the reversal of that case, National League of 
Cities, was based on respect for the federal political process.   
69United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
70See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
71Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
72See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
73
 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
508 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:497 
clearly been in progress since then.  Alden may very well mark the beginning of a  
constitutional epoch.  For not only has the issue in Alden been simmering for more 
than 200 years, but it also lies at the very root of our coordinate system of 
government:  Is a non-consenting State absolutely immune from suit in any state 
court if the right of action arises under a federal law that is properly within 
Congress’s regulatory authority?  Alden only answers a piece of this question.  The 
most restrictive (from the States’ point of view) reading of Alden yields symmetry:  
A non-consenting State is immune from suit in its own courts if, and to the same 
extent, it is immune from suit in the federal courts.  Yet it is doubtful that that is 
what the Court actually intended to say.  About all that is clear is the precise holding 
of the case, namely, that a State is constitutionally immune from any Article I private 
right of action that is brought in a State’s own courts.74 
Beyond that, however, the Court offers no guidance.  What about the 
counterfactual:  is a non-consenting State subject to suit in its own courts to the same 
extent that it is subject to suit in the federal courts?  If, for example, Congress 
successfully abrogates the States’ immunity from federal suit, has it likewise 
abrogated the States’ immunity from suit in their own courts?  To what extent, if any, 
will the state courts remain open if Congress cannot abrogate the States’ sovereign 
immunity?  For example, may the United States bring an action against a non-
consenting State in its own courts?  Does an Ex parte Young75 action pierce a State’s 
immunity from suit in its own courts?76  Are municipalities not immune from suit in 
their State’s own courts?  Finally, is there any doctrinally consistent answer to all of 
these questions in light of the Court’s failure to confront its holding in Testa v. Katt, 
the seminal case concerning the state courts’ constitutional obligation to adjudicate 
federal question claims.  These questions—and their seemingly elusive answers—are 
the focus of the following section of this article.  Surprisingly, the answers to these 
questions lie not in the Alden opinion itself, which is cemented on a rather shaky 
                                                                
74Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). 
75Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
76Without reflection, these questions may seem nonsensical.  If a litigant has the option of 
suing a State in either state or federal court, the choice is obvious.  But therein lies the rub.  A 
litigant may soon not have any choice in the matter.  Indeed, Congress may attempt to stave 
off the federal courts’ ever-expanding docket by enacting statutory restrictions on the 
accessibility of the federal judiciary.  Though a whole host of options are available, the 
following illustrate the point: Congress could  (1) reinstate the federal question “jurisdictional 
amount” for cases brought in federal (but not state) courts; (2) enact a so-called “reverse 
removal” device, whereby a federal court (or a multi-district panel) could transfer related cases 
to the state courts for consolidation and adjudication; (3) confer, for certain causes of action, 
exclusive state court federal question jurisdiction; or (4) cap the maximum number of Article 
III judges that may be appointed.  See generally William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass 
Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1993); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES: LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 23-39 (1995); Joan 
Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1033-36 (1993).  Since some, though 
perhaps not all, of these options are no doubt constitutionally permissible, the state courts may 
well find themselves saddled with federal question claims that constitutionally can—but 
statutorily cannot—be adjudicated in the federal courts.  Thus obvious gains may result from 
this inquiry, that is, from exploring the States’ constitutionally protected jurisdictional 
sovereignty. 
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foundation, but rather in the Court’s prior holdings, which paradoxically includes 
Testa.  What follows, then, is a brief summary of the Alden decision, followed by an 
in depth analysis of several of the Court’s prior holdings.  
C.  Alden, et al. vs. The State of Maine77 
After Garcia, the FLSA once again took hold in the State of Maine, although not 
entirely.78   Maine decided that its probation officers were not eligible for overtime 
pay because they were “professional employees” within the meaning of 
§ 213(a)(1).79  The probation officers thought otherwise, however, and brought suit 
against Maine in federal court.80  The district court held in favor of the probation 
officers, resulting in Maine’s compliance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions.81  
However, while a special master was calculating the back-pay judgment, the 
Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe, which held that a non-consenting State is 
immune from suit in federal court if the statute giving rise to the private right of 
action was based on Congress’s Commerce Power.82  In light of that decision, the 
district court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit affirmed.83 
The probation officers did not seek Supreme Court review at that time, nor would 
it have been fruitful had they done so.  This is because the federal courts have 
uniformly held that the FLSA’s wage and overtime provisions are exclusively 
bottomed on the Commerce Clause.  Thus, even though the FLSA now 
unequivocally subjects the States to suit—in both the federal and state courts—the 
federal courts have unanimously held that Seminole Tribe thwarts Congress’s ability 
to subject the States to an FLSA suit in federal court.84  So it is not surprising that 
instead of seeking Supreme Court review, the probation officers turned to Maine’s 
state courts, although this too proved unavailing.  In a terse opinion, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the Maine Superior Court’s dismissal, holding that 
a State’s immunity from suit in the state courts is coextensive with its immunity from 
suit in the federal courts.85 
                                                                
77527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
78See Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 719 (1st Cir. 1996). 
79See id. at 719-20. 
80See Mills v. Maine, 839 F. Supp. 3 (D. Me. 1993). 
81See Alden v. Maine, No. 98-436, 1999 WL 66190 at * 3 (U.S. Me. Resp. Brief Feb. 11, 
1999).  Because the probation officers only sought to recover their back-pay, an Ex parte 
Young action was not available. 
82See Mills v. State, No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 WL 400510 (D. Me. July 3, 1996). 
83See Mills v. State of Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997). 
84See Abril v. Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 186-89 (4th Cir. 1998); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 
813, 817 (10th Cir. 1997); Raper v. Iowa, 115 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir. 1997); Wilson-Jones v. 
Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206-11 (6th Cir. 1997), modified on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 
(1998). 
85See Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 174 (Me. 1998). 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 23, 1999, and in another 5-to-4 
decision affirmed the state courts’ dismissal and invalidated the FLSA’s 
jurisdictional grant.86  The Court’s sovereign immunity decisions often cling to an 
historical analysis of the ratification and adoption of the Constitution in general and 
its Eleventh Amendment in particular.  Such constitutional questions, as is also so 
often the case, are soaked in controversy.  Alden—in both respects—is no exception. 
The opinion begins with the undeniable: The Constitution preserves to the States 
the dignity, though not the full authority, of a sovereign nation.87  From there, the 
Court reasoned that sovereign immunity has generally been a fundamental aspect of 
the States’ sovereignty; that the Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather than 
established the States’ sovereign immunity; and that the scope of this immunity is 
defined not by the text of the Eleventh Amendment but by the “fundamental 
postulates” that are implicit in the structure of the Constitution.88  In support of the 
these points, the Court considered the States’ reaction to its holding in Chisholm v. 
Georgia,89 a case that unquestionably triggered the adoption of the Eleventh 
Amendment.90  In Chisholm, the Court held that Article III’s grant of jurisdiction 
over controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State” empowered the 
federal courts to hear a suit against a State, notwithstanding the latter’s assertion of 
sovereign immunity.91  The country reacted to this holding swiftly and extremely.  
The very next day, Congress began designing a constitutional amendment that would 
overthrow the Chisholm decision.92  The States, moreover, were equally outraged.93  
To amplify the point, the Court quoted one scholar’s findings that Georgia’s House 
of Representatives passed a bill that made it a crime for anyone to attempt to enforce 
the Chisholm decision; those who did, would “‘suffer death, without benefit of 
clergy, by being hanged.’” 94  The country’s reaction to the Chisholm decision, the 
                                                                
86See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).  Section 216(b) sets forth the following 
jurisdictional grant: “An action to recover the liability . . . may be maintained against any 
employer (including a public agency) in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction by 
any one or more employees.”  29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Law. Co-op. 1999). 
87See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.  The Tenth Amendment, for example, reserves to the States 
those powers that are not prohibited by the Constitution nor delegated to the federal 
government; Article IV, § 3, prohibits the involuntary modification of a State’s territory; and 
Article V permits the States to amend the Constitution by a three fourths vote.  State 
sovereignty, moreover, is also implicit in the very notion of a federal government of limited 
and enumerated powers.  Id. 
88Id. at 729.  See also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
89Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
90See Alden, 527 U.S. at 717-24. 
91See id. at 719. 
92See id. at 720-24 (citing DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, 196 (1997)). 
93See Alden, 527 U.S. at 720-21. 
94The dissent, however, responded in kind, arguing that Georgia’s reaction was an 
aberration, and that even the “author on whom the Court relies has [said that] ‘there was no 
unanimity among the Framers that immunity would exist.’”  Id. at 793. 
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Alden Court thus concluded, underscores the settled doctrinal understanding that the 
Constitution in general, and the Tenth Amendment in particular, implicitly 
recognizes the States’ sovereign immunity.95 
Thus freed from the restrictive language of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court 
proceeded to imply meaning from historical silence—a perilous endeavor indeed.96  
Nothing in the Constitution suggests that the States are not immune from suit in their 
own courts; and although neither the ratification debates nor the Eleventh 
Amendment address this issue, no discussion was necessary.  Everyone just assumed 
that the Constitution did not alter this fundamental and well-entrenched right.97  This 
right, the Court believed, is apparent when one considers the backdrop against which 
the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment were adopted.98  The States were on 
the brink of insolvency.99  They could not discharge their wartime debts, and thus 
understandably feared raids on their state treasuries, an inevitable result if the States 
were amenable to suit in any court.100  Moreover, during the congressional debates on 
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the House of Representatives outright 
rejected a proposal that would have left open the federal courts while the state courts 
were closed.101  Implicit in this proposal, the Court surmised, is the “evident . . . 
premise that the States retained their immunity and the concomitant authority to 
decide whether to allow private suits against the sovereign in their own courts.”102 
Prolonged congressional inaction, the Court continued, further accentuates the 
point.103  For nearly 200 years, Congress has not required the state courts to entertain 
federal suits, but it has permitted them to do so since 1789.104  Indeed, the FLSA is 
among the first generation of statutes that purports to subject the States to suit in 
their own courts.105  Thus Congress’s prolonged inaction in enacting any such 
obligatory statutes, the Court concluded, also “suggests an assumed absence of such 
                                                                
95See id. at 713-15, 722-26. 
96See id; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism: The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
1509, 1522 (1998) (“Debating history or general background surrounding the Constitution 
adds context that is substantively slanted, not just toward the value of federalism in ways that 
the Reconstruction Amendments sought to offset, but also systematically against the interests 
of people of color (constitutional slaves in 1789), women (legal servants), poor people 
(nonvoters), and religious and social nonconformists (social outcasts), in ways that subsequent 
amendments and judicial constructions have sought to ameliorate.”).   
97See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740-46 (1999). 
98See id.  
99See id. at 750. 
100See id. at 720-22, 741. 
101See id. at 720-22.  See also CURRIE, supra note 92, at 196-97. 
102Alden, 527 U.S. at 743. 
103See id. at 743-44. 
104In fact, not until 1875 could the inferior federal courts adjudicate federal question 
claims.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470; FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE 
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM  64-68 (1927).  
105See Alden, 527 U.S. at 744. 
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power.”106  So based on the Framers’ silence, the Constitution’s silence, the Eleventh 
Amendment’s silence and Congress’s prolonged inaction, the Court held that 
sovereign immunity is constitutionally cognizable in a State’s own courts.107   
D.  The Tenth Amendment vs. The Supremacy Clause 
Obviously, there is virtually no substance to the Court’s opinion.  It is largely, if 
not entirely, based on what the Constitution and its elusive history do not say.  At 
most, all that Alden does say is that a State is constitutionally immune from suit in its 
own courts if the private right of action is brought under Article I.  To test the 
validity of this holding, and thereby extract its underlying logic, the next section of 
this article examines the problem under an entirely different and, I think, more 
principled lens.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Court’s holding holds up.  
Read literally, the Tenth Amendment108 says that all powers, regardless of their 
origin, are allocated among the governments and the people in the following order: 
(1) to the federal government to the extent provided in the Constitution; (2) to the 
people to the extent the Constitution prohibits giving such powers to the States; and 
then (3) to the States to the extent such powers have not already been delegated.  
Thus understood, the Tenth Amendment serves as a jurisdictional filter, albeit an 
imprecise one.  All powers, regardless of their origin, are allocated among the federal 
government, the people and the States in accordance with the above formula.  For 
example, by applying this formula, it becomes clear that the power over speech is 
placed in the peoples’ hands.109  This is because the First Amendment prohibits 
Congress from abridging the freedom of speech or the press,110 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment likewise prohibits the States from doing the same.111  So the power over 
                                                                
106Id. (quoting Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 907-08 (1997)). 
107See Alden, 527 U.S. at 711. 
108The actual text of the Tenth Amendment reads more succinctly as follows: “The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
109Of course I am not suggesting, though others have, see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of 
California, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing for an absolutist view of 
the First Amendment), that the people’s power over speech is always immune from 
governmental intrusion.  But the Tenth Amendment should be the starting point.  Indeed, the 
permissible extent of the government’s intrusion should depend on the extent the 
Constitution’s remaining provisions are or are not in accord with the result achieved under the 
Tenth Amendment.  For example, national security concerns may enable the federal 
government to impose restrictions on speech that the First Amendment would otherwise 
protect. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511 n.3 (1980) (“[E]ven in the absence of 
an express agreement—the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests 
by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be 
protected by the First Amendment.”). 
110Since freedom of speech is not an enumerated power, the result would have been the 
same even if the First Amendment did not exist. 
111See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (opining that “freedom of speech 
and of the press . . . are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”). 
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speech, in other words, only gets us to step two before it is then allocated to the 
people.   
But in the sovereign immunity context, the result is less clear, not because of 
what the Constitution does not say, but because of what it does say.  The text of the 
Constitution says nothing about sovereign immunity.  It does not say whether the 
federal government is or is not vested with this power.  Nor does it say whether the 
States are prohibited from exercising this power.  Therefore, from a purely textual 
perspective, the Tenth Amendment vests the sovereign immunity power in the States.  
Yet such a conclusion is far from clear because other constitutional provisions seem 
to counteract this state-court-sovereign-immunity presumption.  Take the Supremacy 
Clause, for example.  It says that the “Judges in every State shall be bound” by the 
U.S. Constitution and all of the federal laws that are “made . . . Pursuan[t]” to the 
Constitution, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.” 112  Thus by constitutionalizing the States’ sovereign immunity, the 
Alden Court created a standoff that it only partially resolved.  If the FLSA is 
constitutional, as Garcia has and continues to hold, the state judges are bound by it.  
However, the state judges are also bound by the Constitution, which now recognizes 
the States’ sovereign immunity.113 
Perhaps one way of breaking this deadlock is to default in favor of the States’ 
sovereign immunity.  After all, state court sovereign immunity, unlike the FLSA, is 
now inherent in the Constitution itself, and whenever a statute is invalidated, the 
Constitution implicitly prevails.  National League of Cities v. Usery114 is a case in 
point.  There, the Tenth Amendment prevailed over a statute Congress enacted under 
the Commerce Clause.  But alas, in that case the Court found that the Commerce 
Power itself did not extend so far; it had not been “made” pursuant to the 
Constitution, and so it had never achieved “supreme” status.115 
Alden, however, is of a different order.  The FLSA’s overtime provision was 
plainly “made” in accordance with the Constitution.  Not only does Garcia say so, 
but the probation officers also conceded the point.116  So does it follow that the 
FLSA’s jurisdictional grant was also “made” in accordance with the Constitution?  If 
so, there is no textually apparent reason why the state courts would not be obligated 
to hear the case.  The law would then have achieved “supreme” status, and nothing in 
the Constitution could have plausibly countered this effect.  But since the Court did 
not overrule Garcia, but nevertheless upheld the States’ state-court-sovereign-
immunity, the Court—for the first time in its history—disconnected Congress’s 
power to provide a forum from its power to provide a right.  No one (that is, until 
now) would have doubted Congress’s power to provide some forum, if the right 
sought to be adjudicated was properly within Congress’s regulatory power. But by 
                                                                
112U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
113Although, at the outset, the Court in Alden simply glossed over the Supremacy Clause, 
stating that it simply begs the constitutionality question, later the Court did consider it, 
however so cryptically in connection with Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).  The actual 
holding in Testa is explored extensively below. 
114426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
115See id. at 844-53. 
116See Alden, 527 U.S. at 808-10 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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constitutionalizing the States’ sovereign immunity, the Court unavoidably drove a 
wedge between Congress’s power to regulate the States’ intrastate activities and its 
power to provide (at least) a private right of action to enforce the same.   
Such a far-reaching departure from the past, one would imagine, would not be 
achieved inferentially; yet that is the sine qua non of the Court’s holding.  An 
attentive examination of the constitutionality of the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant is 
thus sorely needed, for if it alone is constitutional, the Court’s loose holding in Alden 
substantively falls apart. 
One way to determine this is to ask whether the constitutionality of the 
jurisdictional grant necessarily trains on the constitutionality of the statute’s 
substantive right.  Put differently, is the constitutionality of a statute’s substantive 
and jurisdictional grants coextensive with one another?117  Chief Justice Marshall 
thought so.  In Cohens v. Virginia,118 after being convicted in state court for violating 
a Virginia law that prohibited selling lottery tickets, the defendants appealed to the 
Supreme Court, arguing that the Supremacy Clause immunized their conduct 
because a District of Columbia law authorized the ticket sales in the State of 
Virginia.  Chief Justice Marshall first addressed the Court’s jurisdiction: “If any 
proposition may be considered . . . a political axiom, this, we think, may be so 
considered[:] that the judicial power of every well constituted government must be 
co-extensive with the legislative, and must be capable of deciding every judicial 
question which grows out of the constitution and laws.”119  The Court then rejected 
the State’s immunity defense, holding that (at least insofar as writs of errors are 
concerned) the Eleventh Amendment does not apply, but affirmed the State’s 
conviction nonetheless.120 
This “coextensive axiom” is inapposite.  Even if it springs from the Constitution, 
the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant may still be unconstitutional because, to quote 
Hamilton, there exists “a constitutional method of giving efficacy to [the FLSA’s] 
provisions.”121  As the Court in Alden made somewhat clear,122 absent the State’s 
                                                                
117Though analytically related, this question is unlike the theory of “protective 
jurisdiction” in two respects.  First, the jurisdictional grant at issue in Alden is tied to a 
substantive federal right; and second, the issue here is whether that jurisdictional grant 
obligates the state courts, not the federal courts, to adjudicate the substantive claim.  For a 
general discussion of the variant theories of protective jurisdiction, see Textile Workers Union 
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 469-84 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); RICHARD H. 
FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 898-
907 (1996).  The Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted this theory. See, e.g., Mesa v. 
California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) (seeing no need to adopt it).  See also 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (rejecting on First Amendment grounds the 
“greater-includes-the-lesser” argument).  
118Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 376 (1821). 
119Id. at 384. 
120See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 406-12, 448.  Chief Justice Marshall reaffirmed this principle in 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 818 (1924) (“The executive department may 
constitutionally execute every law which the Legislature may constitutionally make, and the 
judicial department may receive from the Legislature the power of construing every such 
law.”). 
121THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in FALLON, supra note 117, at 
21-23. 
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consent, there remains one, perhaps two, ways an employee can still recover back 
pay from his state employer.  The State may still be brought to book indirectly 
through a suit brought by the Secretary of Labor;123 and it may also be possible for 
the employee to simply bring an action against the State in a neighboring state 
court.124  Thus every substantive right the FLSA gives, the federal courts, at a 
minimum, may adjudicate.  Whether the former may be brought in the States’ own 
courts, or whether the latter may be brought at all, the Court did not say.  What is 
important, at least at this point, is the constitutionality of the FLSA’s jurisdictional 
grant—an inquiry that Chief Justice Marshall’s “coextensive axiom” simply does not 
resolve. 
Rather than asking whether the constitutionality of Congress’s power to confer 
jurisdiction trains (or is included within) Congress’s power to substantively legislate, 
another approach may be to ask whether the jurisdictional grant is itself a “law” 
within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause.  While no authority lies directly on this 
point, the Court’s interpretation of the term “law”—for purposes of Article III—may 
cast some discerning light on how the Court would interpret the term “law” for 
purposes of the Supremacy Clause.  Both provisions, after all, contain the phrase 
“the laws of the United States.”   
Here again, Chief Justice Marshall begins but does not end our analysis.  Osborn 
v. Bank of the United States125 is, to be sure, a fixed star in the Court’s “arising 
under” firmament.  The Bank of the United States brought an action in federal court 
to enjoin one Ralph Osborn, a state auditor, from levying and collecting an 
unconstitutional state tax.126  Hypothesizing on the facts of a companion case,127 the 
                                                          
122See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57. 
123See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). 
124See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (holding that a State is not immune from a 
state law claim that is brought in another State’s courts).  In Alden, the Court reaffirmed its 
holding in Nevada, without so much as mentioning the state law character of that case, and for 
good reason.  Were the Court to distinguish Nevada on the basis of its “font of the law”—that 
is, on the basis that that suit concerned a state, rather than a federal, law—it would have 
opened Pandora’s box.  According to the Eleventh Amendment, the federal courts are 
incapable of adjudicating any suit that is brought against a non-consenting State by a 
“Citizen[] of another State.”  Since the lower federal courts were incapable of hearing federal 
question claims until 1875, state law necessarily filled up much of what the Eleventh 
Amendment was initially all about.  So to even suggest that sovereign immunity, in any of its 
forms, is predicated on the existence of a federal claim would be tantamount to overruling 
everything except Chisholm, the case that unquestionably triggered the adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment in the first place!  Thus, so long as personal jurisdiction and venue exist, 
it seems inconceivable, on this basis alone, to deny an employee the opportunity to sue his 
State on a federal question claim, if that claim is filed in a sister State’s courts.  In fact, as the 
discussion below demonstrates, when a federal question is at issue, the sister state court may 
not have any choice in matter. 
12522 U.S. 738 (1824). 
126See id. at 739-42.  Several years earlier, the Court held that Congress has the power to 
establish a national bank, and that the States do not have the power to tax it.  See McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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Court concluded that the Bank could have brought a garden variety breach of 
contract action in federal court because the case would necessarily involve the 
adjudication of a federal “ingredient,” namely, the Bank’s capacity to acquire 
property, to enter into contracts, and to sue and be sued thereunder.128  Osborn’s 
“federal ingredient” theory thus defines the outer limits of what constitutes the “laws 
of the United States” for purposes of Article III jurisdiction.129  But could a 
jurisdictional grant constitute a “federal ingredient”? 
Although at least one commentator has suggested that a jurisdictional grant is 
itself an Article III “law,” so long as some national interest is at stake,130 the 
orthodox and, indeed, overwhelmingly persuasive view rejects this proposition.  In 
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,131 a breach of contract action, a Dutch 
corporation sued an arm of the Government of Nigeria in federal court.  Although the 
district court had neither diversity nor statutory federal question jurisdiction,132  the 
Court found the presence of a federal “law,” nonetheless.  Contrary to two of its prior 
decisions133 that “rejected the view that the jurisdictional statute itself constituted . . . 
                                                          
127See Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. 904 (1824). Because the 
Bank sought to enjoin the collection of an unconstitutional state tax, the Court in Osborn, at 
least under today’s view, was well within the limits of Article III. 
128See id. at 824-25. 
129Actually, the Court slightly extended this holding in the Pacific Removal Cases (Texas 
& P.Ry. v. Kirk), 115 U.S. 1 (1885), by holding that a suit brought by or against a federally 
chartered railroad, regardless of its nature, was a “law of the United States” within the 
meaning of Article III.  That this case was, indeed, a “sport,” (see Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 
481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), is apparent when one considers the Court’s effort in 
lobbying Congress to “nullify its own decision in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases.”  
Frankfuter & Landis, supra note 104, at 272-73.  Congress agreed and enacted what is now 28 
U.S.C. § 1349, which eliminates federal question jurisdiction based solely on the existence of 
a federal charter that establishes the juridical existence of one of the parties, unless the United 
States owns a majority of that party’s capital stock.  While this statute significantly pares back 
the application of the federal ingredient doctrine, that doctrine continues to define the “laws of 
the United States” for purposes of Article III.  But see American Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G. & 
A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 255 (1992) (slighting the effect of § 1349 and potentially limiting the 
scope of Article III’s arising under jurisdiction to federal charters that “specifically mention[] 
the federal courts.”).  
130See Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 
BYU L. REV. 731, 803 (1995) (“The widely-held view endorsed by the Court in Mesa and 
Verlinden—that federal jurisdiction cannot constitutionally ‘arise under’ a purely 
jurisdictional statute—is a fallacy.”). 
131461 U.S. 480, 483 (1983). 
132See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1331, respectively.  Diversity jurisdiction did not exist because 
the case did not involve “a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States” under Article III; 
and statutory federal question jurisdiction did not exist because a federal question did not 
appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.  See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491-92, 494. 
133See Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. 12, 14 (1800); Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 
53 U.S. 443, 451-53 (1851). 
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‘arising under’ jurisdiction,” the Court held that the statute in question in this case 134 
“necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law.”135 
Now it is true that the statute at issue in Verlinden arguably did not create any 
substantive federal rights; yet however specious the Court’s assertion—that a federal 
law did in fact exist—is, this defect in the Court’s holding is not relevant for our 
purposes.  The FLSA does confer a substantive federal right.  The important point 
Verlinden provides is that the Court interpreted its prior decisions as rejecting the 
idea that a jurisdictional grant is itself a “law” within the meaning of Article III.  And 
if there remains any doubt on this point, one need only turn to Justice O’Connor, 
who has said that a “pure jurisdictional statute[] which seek[s] to do nothing more 
than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases cannot support Art. III ‘arising 
under jurisdiction.’”136 
So it seems clear that the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant is not an Article III “law,” 
and given the Tenth Amendment’s presumptive finding in favor of the States 
retaining the sovereign immunity power, it seems almost equally clear that the 
FLSA’s jurisdictional grant is not a “law” under the Supremacy Clause.  But there is 
more.  A congressional enactment is not supreme nor, for that matter, is it even valid 
if it is not in accord with Congress’s enumerated powers.  In fact, such a law is by 
definition “an usurpation of power.”137  Yet there is one enumerated power that calls 
for pause.  According to Article I, § 8, “Congress shall have [the] Power . . .  To 
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”138  Thus, it might be argued that 
this provision, as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause,139 somehow arms 
Congress with the power to impose jurisdiction on the state courts; and that by doing 
so, Congress has made a “law” pursuant to one of its enumerated powers.  Such a 
view, however, does not wash, for it is manifestly at odds with the Court’s prior 
holdings, and it is inconsistent with the interrelated structure of Articles I and III.  
Congress need not create any inferior courts—or at least that is what Article III, 
§ 1, says.140  Instead, Congress may create so-called “legislative courts” whose 
                                                                
134See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000). 
135See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493, 496. 
136Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989).  See also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 473-
74 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (chiding an application of protective jurisdiction that would 
“construe[] ‘laws’ to include jurisdictional statutes where Congress could have legislated 
substantively in a field.”). 
137THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
138U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.   
139Id. 
140Whether all or at least some of Article III’s original and appellate jurisdiction must be 
vested in an Article III court(s) has been hotly contested ever since Justice Story’s seminal 
opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 328-36 (1816).  For an exhaustive 
contemporary argument that draws on Justice Story’s view that only certain Article III 
jurisdictional tiers must be vested in an Article III court(s), see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. 
REV. 205 (1985); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction 
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362-66, 1371-74 (1953).  
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jurisdictional authority might extend beyond the limits of Article III.  In fact when it 
comes to legislative courts, Congress has never felt constrained by Article III.141  In 
1823, for example, Congress enacted a law that greatly fortified Florida’s territorial 
government.142  Not only did this law empower the territorial council to pass all laws 
over “all rightful objects of legislation,” but it also authorized the territorial courts to 
hear “all civil cases arising under . . . the laws . . . which may at any time be enacted 
by the legislative council.”143  By thus conferring general jurisdiction, this statute 
obviously exceeded the scope of Article III.  But in American Insurance Co. v. 
Canter,144 Chief Justice Marshall nonetheless upheld the constitutionality of this 
statute because these territorial courts were not Article III courts; they were so-called 
“legislative courts.”  Hence since at least 1823, it has been apparently145 established 
that a jurisdictional grant may constitutionally exceed the scope of Article III.  But 
would the “judicial power” under Article III open up to accommodate the full scope 
of these territorial courts’ jurisdiction? 
A majority of the Court in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer 
Co., Inc.,146 took the position that it could not, although one would be hard pressed to 
find that holding in Justice Jackson’s plurality opinion.  In this case, the Court 
upheld a district court’s diversity jurisdiction over a suit brought by a District of 
Columbia citizen against a citizen of Maryland, even though the Court had 
previously held147 (and did not overrule its holding) that the District of Columbia is 
                                                          
Despite the permissive language of Article III, § 1, this article accepts this portion of Justice 
Story’s position. 
141Congress may have enacted a general jurisdictional grant as early as 1787.  See CURRIE, 
supra note 11, at 104 (finding that the First Congress “adapt[ed]” the Northwest Ordinance, 
which, in turn, authorized the creation of a three-judge panel that, in conjunction with an 
appointed Governor, would “adopt ‘such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may 
be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district’”); Capital Traction Co. v. 
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 6 (1899) (explaining that this congressional enactment authorized “judicial 
proceedings according to the course of the common law.”). 
142Act Cong. 1823, § 5, 3 St. at Large, p. 751 (cited in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 
26 U.S. 511 (1828)). 
143Canter, 26 U.S. at 546. 
144Id. 
145The conclusion of this issue, however, is open to some debate.  See Paul Bator, The 
Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. 
L.J. 233, 252 n.62 (1990), (raising without resolving the issue).  For example, it may be 
possible to treat the legislative grant as a de facto federalization of all of the laws the 
territory’s legislature subsequently enacted.  Although possible, it is improbable.  The Court in 
Canter seemed to assume that this did not happen.  There, the issue concerned a territorial 
court’s capacity to exercise exclusive Article III admiralty jurisdiction, not “arising under” 
jurisdiction.  See Canter, 26 U.S. at 546. (holding that the territorial court was competent to 
adjudicate this claim because the Article III exclusivity “limitation does not extend to the 
territories.”)  But since the resolution of this issue—that is, whether Article III cabins a 
legislative court’s jurisdiction—is unclear, both sides of this argument are considered. 
146337 U.S. 582 (1949). 
147See Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445 (1805). 
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not a “State” within the meaning of Article III.148  In order to get there, however, 
Justice Jackson’s opinion, joined by only two other Justices, took the position that 
Congress could—and in this case did—expand the district court’s jurisdiction 
beyond the limits of Article III.149  The other six Justices, however, flatly rejected 
this “dangerous doctrine.”150  Justice Frankfurter profoundly pressed the point: “It 
was because Article III defines and confines the limits of jurisdiction of the courts 
which are established under Article III that the first Court of Claims Act fell.”151  To 
this day, a majority of the Court has never agreed with Justice Jackson’s opinion.   
Thus by combining Canter and Tidewater, one rule seems to emerge: Article III 
caps an Article III152 but not a legislative court’s jurisdiction.153  Applying this rule, it 
might appear that the state courts in Alden were required to hear that case.  After all, 
the state courts are not Article III courts, and Article I permits Congress to 
“constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”  Consequently, it might be 
argued that the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant converts the state courts into legislative 
courts, at least with respect to the FLSA’s substantive provisions.  In that event, there 
would be no need to consider whether the jurisdictional grant is a “law” under the 
Supremacy Clause because it only created the state court’s legislative existence.  All 
that would then remain would be a federal question claim in a court that is not bound 
by the limits of Article III.  The state legislative courts could thus entertain the 
action, even though the Article III courts could not. 
However, coming full circle, one could again argue that the FLSA’s substantive 
and jurisdictional grants are not constitutional; according to Osborn, Verlinden, and 
Mesa, only the substantive grant is.  While this is true, there is another, more 
definitive reason why this argument is empty.  The Court has consistently held that 
the Constitute Tribunals Clause is limited to the creation of Article III courts: “The 
power given Congress in Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, ‘To constitute Tribunals inferior to the 
Supreme Court,’ plainly relates to the ‘inferior Courts’ provided for in Art. III, § 1; it 
                                                                
148See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 583-603. 
149See id. at 603-04. 
150See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 626 (Rutledge, J., concurring in result).  Only Justices 
Rutledge and Murphy believed that the District of Columbia was a “State” under Article III’s 
Diversity Clause, and only Justices Jackson, Black, and Burton believed that Congress could 
use its Article I powers to expand the jurisdictional limits of Article III.  So even though six of 
the nine Justices took the position that Congress could not use Article I to expand Article III, 
Justice Jackson’s plurality opinion says that it can.  
151Id. at 652. 
152Chief Justice Marshall is in accord: Article III is “that pure fountain from which all the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is derived.”  Canter, 26 U.S. at 545.  
153The Bankruptcy and Tax Courts are typically called “Article I courts” because they 
were, predictably enough, enacted under Article I.  But not all legislative courts are Article I 
courts.  The territorial courts in Canter, for example, were enacted under either the federal 
government’s “general right of sovereignty” or, more likely, Article IV.  Thus to use the term 
“Article I” in the generic sense is not only misleading. It is also a misnomer.  Although the 
phrase (à la Chief Justice Marshall) “legislative courts” is more confusing, it is clearly the 
more accurate of the two.  
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has never been relied on for the establishment of any other tribunals.”154  Indeed the 
territorial courts in Canter, for example, were created under either Congress’s 
“general right of sovereignty,” or its Article IV power to “make all needful rules and 
regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States.”155 
That the Constitute Tribunals Clause carries the inherent power to establish 
legislative courts is also inconsistent with Tidewater, not the mention the interrelated 
structure of Articles I and III.  If the Constitutes Tribunals Clause could constitute a 
legislative court, the latter would necessarily be “inferior to the Supreme Court.”  
Yet for that to happen, the legislative court’s jurisdictional capacity would have to be 
at least as restrictive as the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction.  But 
Tidewater teaches us that the Supreme Court could not review this case because its 
jurisdiction is subject to Article III, and Article III does not cover this case.  Thus the 
state legislative courts’ holdings would be beyond the Supreme Court’s reviewing 
capacity.  So in what sense, then, would the state legislative courts be “inferior” to 
the Supreme Court?  Because a state legislative court is not an “inferior Tribunal,” at 
least to the extent that its jurisdiction exceeds the scope of Article III, the state courts 
in Alden were not legislative courts.156 
Yet perhaps Congress has never conferred more jurisdiction than Article III 
permits.  It might be argued that Canter is akin to Osborn, in that the Territory’s very 
existence was dependent on a federal statute, and thus its capacity to govern 
constituted the federal ingredient at issue.  However, this proposition is doubtful.  In 
Canter, the Court held that even though the territorial courts were not Article III 
courts, they could nevertheless exercise jurisdiction over an admiralty claim that, 
according to Article III, could only be adjudicated in an Article III court.157  Chief 
Justice Marshall based this holding on the theory that the legislative courts “could 
not receive” the Article III judicial powers, and were thus not subject to Article III’s 
exclusivity limitation.158  Although the Court may have subsequently repudiated this 
“theological” approach,159 its supposition that the territorial court’s jurisdiction 
                                                                
154Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (holding that the Court of Claims and 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are Article III courts).  Legislative courts have been 
enacted under a number of other provisions, however.  See, e.g., Kendall v. United States, 37 
U.S. 524, 619 (1838) (upholding the creation of legislative courts in the District of Columbia 
under Article I, § 8, cl. 17); Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commr., 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 
1966), certiorari denied 385 U.S. 918 (upholding the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals 
under Article I, § 8, cl. 1); Northern Pipe Construction v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982) (rejecting an argument that Article I, § 8, cl. 4 authorized Congress to enact the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978). 
155Canter, 26 U.S. at 546. 
156The Alden Court has at least intimated that it is in accord.  See Alden, 527 U.S. at 753 
(“[A]rticle [III] in no way suggests, however, that state courts may be required to assume 
jurisdiction that could not be vested in the federal courts.”)  This is no doubt correct; as more 
fully fleshed out below, Congress cannot “require” the state courts to assume jurisdiction over 
any federal claim.  
157See Canter, 26 U.S. at 546. 
158Id. 
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exceeded the scope of Article III has never been doubted.  Moreover, if the federal 
statute that created the Territory’s legislature federalized all of the Territory’s laws, 
there would have been no reason for the Court to consider the justiciability of this 
admiralty limitation in the first place. 
This is no doubt an “abstruse issue,”160 and one that may still need to be resolved, 
but it only proves the point all the more.  If Article III caps both the Article III and 
the legislative courts’ jurisdictional capacity, then the state courts could never wear 
their “legislative” hats to adjudicate a Commerce Clause private right of action 
against their own non-consenting State.  According to Seminole Tribe,161 those 
claims are outside the scope of Article III, and therefore outside the scope of the state 
legislative court’s jurisdiction.162 
At this point, if just one hardened rule has emerged it is this: A jurisdictional 
grant is not a “law” within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause.  So it would 
appear that there is a partially symmetrical relationship between an Article III “law” 
and an Article VI “law.” 
The Court in Alden also looked to Article III, although not to interpret what a law 
is, but to confine the possible obligations that could be imposed on the state courts.163  
This exposes the key to the Court’s dilemma.  At one point in the opinion, the Court 
brushed off the Supremacy Clause as if it was utterly beside the point.164  The 
Supremacy Clause, the Court quipped, merely begs the question of whether the law 
is itself constitutional.165  As a textual matter this is true, but then the Court never 
analyzed whether the jurisdictional grant—the very law (or at least piece of the law) 
that it ultimately invalidated—was constitutional.  Instead, the Court, not 
surprisingly, silently invalidated the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant.  First, the Court put 
a good face on the standoff, holding that even though a constitutionally enacted 
substantive right is the supreme law of the land, it does not follow that the State’s 
constitutionally based immunity defense must yield.166  Then much later, after it had 
well established the absence of any prohibitory precedent, the Court came back to 
                                                          
159See Bator, supra note 145, at 242-43.  But see Collins, Article III Cases, State Courts 
Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 156 (1995) (demonstrating 
persuasively from a historical perspective that the state courts are “incapable of receiving” any 
jurisdiction from Congress because their jurisdictional power is “granted to them as a matter 
of state law.”)  Professor Collins’s historical findings are fully consistent with this Article’s 
analytical conclusions, namely, that only the States can define their own courts’ jurisdiction. 
160See Bator, supra note 145, at n.62. 
161517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
162At the cusp of the Court’s sovereign immunity spree, one commentator argued that state 
courts could wear both hats. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1957, 1961 (1993).  Besides the arguments made thus far, however, it appears that this 
conclusion is based on “spotty” historical findings. See Michael G. Collins, Article III, Cases, 
State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 137-39 (1995).  
163See Alden, 572 U.S. at 706. 
164Indeed, the Court devoted less than one page of its lengthy opinion to an analysis of 
both the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment. See Alden, 572 U.S. at 713, 753. 
165Id. 
166Id. 
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the Supremacy Clause and delivered the definitive ispe dixit: “The Supremacy 
Clause does impose specific obligations on state judges.  There can be no serious 
contention, however, that the Supremacy Clause imposes greater obligations on 
state-court judges than on the Judiciary of the United States itself.”167  There can be 
no serious doubt about the first assertion, but the second is merely a cobbled attempt 
to avoid overruling Testa sub silentio.168  While it is unclear whether the Court has 
done that, the discussion that follows demonstrates that the Court should not overrule 
Testa because it is entirely consistent with Alden’s holding. 
E. Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare vs. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare 
Thus far, it would appear that Testa presents a heavy counterweight to Alden’s 
holding.  Justice Thurgood Marshall thought so, but he was mistaken.  The Court in 
fact broached this exact issue in Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare.169  Yet however tempting, the Court wisely resisted 
resolving it because this case had nothing to do with state-court-sovereign-
immunity.170  Rather, it considered whether a Missouri citizen could bring an FLSA 
action against the State of Missouri in federal—not state—court. 
In concurring with the majority’s holding, Justice Marshall disagreed with the 
majority in all respects, save one: that the State of Missouri did not implicitly 
consent to federal jurisdiction.171  Justice Marshall agreed with the dissenting opinion 
in two particulars: that a State’s immunity from suit derives not from the 
Constitution but from the common law; and that Congress attempted to lift the 
State’s sovereign immunity.172  But Justice Marshall also believed that attempt was 
ineffective because Article III strips the federal courts of jurisdiction whether a non-
citizen brought the suit or not.173  Thus, Justice Marshall sided with the majority’s 
holding that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction.174   
                                                                
167Id. at 753 (emphasis added). 
168Even worse than the Court’s Supremacy Clause discussion, both the majority and the 
dissent devoted a combined total of less than one sentence to Testa, the case that Justice 
Thurgood Marshall believed resolved the exact issue in this case.  See Employees of Dep’t of 
Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 297-98 (1973) 
(Marshall J., concurring).  The Court avoided dealing with this apparent conflict, and probably 
granted certiorari, because the probation officers failed to raise this and a related waiver issue 
in the state trial court. See Brief for Respondent, 1999 WL 66190, at * 41.  Although the Court 
briefly dealt with the waiver issue, see Alden, 527 U.S. at 737, it nevertheless ignored Testa’s 
implications all together. 
169411 U.S. 279, 287 (1973). 
170Id. 
171Id. at 296-97.  This aspect of the Court’s holding demonstrates its uneasiness, if not its 
open hostility, towards the Court’s prior holding in Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 
(1964), which ruled that Alabama had implicitly waived its sovereign immunity by merely 
engaging in interstate commerce.  
172Id. at 288, 289. 
173Id. at 294. 
174This holding—that the FLSA did not evince an unequivocal congressional intent to 
abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity—instigated Congress’s 1974 amendments.  Two 
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However, the absence of federal jurisdiction, Justice Marshall unnecessarily 
continued, does not mean that state employees “are without a forum in which 
personally to seek redress against the State[:]” 
Section 16(b)’s authorization for employee suits to be brought ‘in any 
court of competent jurisdiction’ includes state as well as federal courts. 
. . . Congress has the power to lift the State’s common-law immunity from 
suit insofar as that immunity conflicts with the regulatory authority 
conferred upon it by the Commerce Clause. . . . While constitutional 
limitations upon the federal judicial power bar a federal court action by 
these employees to enforce their rights, the courts of the State nevertheless 
have an independent constitutional obligation to entertain employee 
actions to enforce those rights.  See Testa v. Katt 330 U.S. 386 (1947).175  
Since Missouri’s courts were empowered to hear “suits of this character,” and 
since federal law stands supreme, the Constitution, Justice Marshall argued, requires 
that the state courts “enforce it, even if it conflicts with state policy.”176   
 Viewed from any angle, however, Testa does not support Justice Marshall’s 
obligatory view of state court jurisdiction.177  In fact, as the following analysis amply 
demonstrates, Testa actually (and no doubt ironically) supports the en masse 
rejection of Justice Marshall’s position.  
F.  Testa, et al. vs. Katt 
Harry Katt sold a car to Alfred Testa in violation of the Emergency Price Control 
Act, which pursuant to Congress’s war powers178 imposed price caps on the sale of 
certain goods and services.  So Testa sued Katt in state court but ultimately lost.179  
Since this federal law provided Testa with a triple damages remedy “in any court of 
competent jurisdiction,” the state court concluded that it was a penal law and 
dismissed the case.180  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously 
reversed.181 
Scholars have generally read Testa in one of two ways.  Some, relying on the 
opinion’s strong Supremacy Clause prose, believe that the Court adopted a broad 
                                                          
years later, however, the Court’s holding in National League of Cities neutralized the effect of 
these amendments; and nine years after that, the Court again reversed itself and overruled 
National League of Cities in Garcia.  See discussion in Part I, infra.  
175Id. at 297-98. 
176Id. at 298. 
177See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 184 n.45 (1988). 
178See Federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, amended by the Stabilization 
Extension Act of 1944, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 925(e); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 
(1944) (upholding the delegation of legislative authority to the Office of Price 
Administration); see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second 
World War, 1941-1946, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 27-33 (1987).  
179See Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312 (1946). 
180Id. at 313. 
181See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
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view of the state courts’ duty to adjudicate concurrent federal question claims.182  
Under this approach, the existence of an analogous state law claim is irrelevant.  The 
Supremacy Clause imposes an independent obligation on the state courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over concurrent federal question claims.183  Relying on the opinion’s last 
paragraph, however, other scholars believe that Testa merely reaffirms the Court’s 
holding in Mondou.184  According to this view, Congress could require the state 
courts to adjudicate concurrent federal claims only if they have jurisdiction over an 
analogous state law claim.185  The “fact that both possibilities are conceivable” is no 
doubt “a clue that neither is probable.”186  Another clue turns on Justice Frankfurter’s 
silence in light of his unshakable belief that a state court’s jurisdiction lies solely in 
its creator’s hands.187  It thus seems doubtful that he would stand idly by if he 
                                                                
182Id. 
183See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: 
Proposal for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, reprinted in THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 155 (Philip B. Kurland ed. 1975) (arguing for a broad 
interpretation); Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State 
Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1165-71, 1182 (1984).  Justice Marshall clearly 
subscribed to this view.  See Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 297-
98 (1973) (Marshall J., concurring). 
184See Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 55 (1912).  Here, the Court 
considered whether a federal statute “may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states 
when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate.”  Id. (emphasis added).  This 
case in no way concerned Congress’s ability to compel the state courts to entertain a federal 
claim that was outside the scope of their jurisdiction “as defined by the Constitution and laws 
of the state.”  Id. (emphasis added)  Rather, this case held that once the state courts have 
jurisdiction over the matter, the state courts cannot decline to hear the federal claim because 
(1) they disagree with the substantive merits of the federal claim (i.e., its “policy”) or (2) they 
would be confused or inconvenienced.  See id. at 55-56.  Before holding that the state courts 
could do neither of these, the Court thrice mentioned that “there is not here involved any 
attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of [the] state courts.”  Id. at 55, 56.  
Yet from this opinion somehow arose the notion that the state courts are obligated to enforce 
analogous federal claims.  This view simply confounds the state courts’ substantive obligation 
under the Supremacy Clause with their state-prescribed jurisdictional obligations. 
185See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 117, at 113 n.13 (1988) (eschewing the First Edition’s 
narrow view in favor of an ambivalent view); Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce 
Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 HARV. L. REV. 
966, 971 (1947) (interpreting the holding narrowly).  
186RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 297 (1990). 
187Justice Frankfurter subscribed to the view, consistent with this article, that the state 
courts were only compelled—and, indeed, were only empowered—to hear those claims that 
were in accord with their State’s legislative mandate.  See Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 
(1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Neither Congress nor the British Parliament nor the 
Vermont Legislature has power to confer jurisdiction upon the New York courts.  But the 
jurisdiction conferred upon them by the only authority that has power to create them and to 
confer jurisdiction upon them—namely the law-making power of the State of New York—
enables them to enforce rights no matter what the legislative source of the right may be.”) 
(emphasis added). 
Professor Wechsler believed that Testa’s “final paragraph may have been a concession to 
[the] Justices who thought, as Justice Frankfurter did, that there were limits to federal 
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believed Testa recognized any such federal power.  The third and in fact dispositive 
clue requires a rigorous analysis of the real issues that were at stake in this case.  
Testa casts no cloud over the Court’s previous, and near obsessive, intimations 
that Congress cannot alter the jurisdiction of the States’ courts.188  In fact, Testa 
practically says so.  A careful review of Robinson v. Norato,189 the case upon which 
the state court in Testa relied, reveals the key to the Testa decision.  Precisely the 
same issue was presented in both cases: Are the state courts “without jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the case at bar.”190  Tackling that question, the state court 
in Robinson worked the syllogism: (1) international law prohibits the enforcement of 
the penal laws of another sovereign;191 (2) the States are sovereign and thus cannot 
enforce the penal laws of another State;192 (3) the federal government is akin to the 
States, and thus its penal laws are not enforceable in the States’ courts;193 and (4) the 
Emergency Price Control Act is a penal statute.194  Therefore, the state courts cannot 
entertain an action under the Emergency Price Control Act.   
In support of its first two premises, the Robinson court cited Wisconsin v. Pelican 
Ins., Co.,195 where Justice Gray held that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction 
over a suit to enforce a Wisconsin State Court’s criminal conviction of a Louisiana 
citizen.  Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits brought by a State 
against a citizen of another State, the Supreme Court held that it nevertheless could 
not entertain jurisdiction over the Louisiana defendant because Louisiana’s courts 
did not have jurisdiction over the matter.196  This is so because state courts do not 
enforce another State’s penal laws.197  Thus the Supreme Court held, and this is key, 
that if it could exercise original jurisdiction, the result would be no different than if 
                                                          
mandates to state courts.”  Gordon & Gross, supra note 183, at 1159 n.62.  There is surely 
more to this opinion than meets the causal eye.  A more plausible view, however, is that the 
federal courts desperately needed the state courts’ assistance in enforcing this War-time 
measure—a measure that essentially federalized state law contracts and certain rental 
activities.  So the Court hid the ball.  See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 359 (1963) (tendering the view that the States did not much like this 
statute); see also Robinson v. Norato, 43 A.2d 467, 468 (1945) (opining that the Emergency 
Price Control Act “constitute[s] a direct interference with interests in realty and indirectly 
affect[s] the incidence of tenure . . . which heretofore have never been considered to be within 
the domain of federal power either in peace or war.”). 
188See Gordon & Gross, supra note 183, at 1159 n.169. 
18943 A.2d 467 (R.I. 1945). 
190Id. at 258; Testa, 71 A.2d at 474 (“If, under the established law of Rhode Island, the 
act . . . is penal in its nature, must our courts take jurisdiction?”) (emphasis added). 
191See id. at 468 (citing The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825), and, more 
importantly, Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888)). 
192See id.  
193See id. at 471 (citing Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876)). 
194See id. at 263. 
19527 U.S. 265 (1888). 
196See id. at 287-89. 
197See id. at 291. 
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the defendant’s courts exercised jurisdiction, and that is something they cannot do.  
In other words, exercising original jurisdiction in this case would be no different than 
requiring the state courts to do the same; the Supreme Court cannot constitutionally 
require the state courts to exercise jurisdiction, and so the Supreme Court cannot 
exercise its original jurisdiction.198  
Since the Pelican case dealt with a state penal statute, the state court in Robinson 
needed to find some authority that would extend this rule to the reverse fact 
pattern—that is, to a state court applying a federal statute.  Although the Robinson 
court could find no binding federal authority on this point, Justice Gray again fit the 
bill.  In Huntington v. Attrill,199 Justice Gray let loose the dictum: “Upon similar 
grounds, the courts of a state cannot be compelled to take jurisdiction of a suit to 
recover a like penalty for a violation of a law of the United States.”200   This case, 
however, had nothing to do with a federal statute,201 but it did pin cite some even 
weightier dictum, that of Justice Story in Martin v. Hunters Lessee.202  There, Justice 
Story turned today’s orthodox view of the Madisonian Compromise on its head.203  
He posited the riddle that has since puzzled scholars and courts alike: Does the 
Constitution require that all (or at least some) of Article III’s jurisdictional grants be 
vested in the Article III courts?  He believed it did because Congress could not 
compel the state courts to exercise jurisdiction.204  Later on in this opinion, Justice 
Story stated that the Constitution prohibited Congress from permitting the States to 
adjudicate the criminal laws of the U.S.205  Justice Gray based his dictum in 
Huntington on these last two points.  He claimed that a State could not enforce a 
federal penal law because (1) Congress cannot impose a jurisdictional obligation on 
the state courts; and (2) federal criminal laws could not be adjudicated in the state 
                                                                
198See id. at 299-300.  Now it is true that the Court never explicitly said that accepting 
jurisdiction is tantamount to an obligatory expansion of the state court’s jurisdiction, but the 
inference is unavoidable.  Otherwise, there would be no reason for the Court to have gone to 
such great lengths to explain that the state courts are barred from enforcing the penal laws of 
another State. 
199146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892). 
200Id. at 672. 
201This case merely concerned the state law enforcement of a New York state court penal 
conviction against a Maryland defendant. 
20214 U.S. 304 (1816). 
203See Collins, supra note 159, at 105-35, for an excellent discussion of the Madisonian 
Compromise. 
204See Martin, 14 U.S. at 330 (“Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of 
the United States, except in courts ordained and established by itself.”).  This mandatory 
vesting view is gaining in popularity.  See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of 
Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating 
the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction 65 B. U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990). 
205See Martin, 14 U.S. at 337 (“No part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States 
can, consistently with the constitution, be delegated to state tribunals.”). 
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courts.  The court in Robinson largely based its holding—that the state courts did not 
have jurisdiction over the federal penal statute—on Justice Gray’s dictum.206 
On appeal, the Supreme Court had to reject one of Justice Gray’s aforementioned 
claims.  If the Court rejected Justice Gray’s first point, it would have had to overrule 
the Pelican case.  However, since Justice Gray’s second point was based only on 
Justice Story’s dictum, the Court rejected it and left the Pelican case intact.  The 
Court accomplished this in three steps.  First, the Court stated that it was “conceded” 
that under the State’s laws, the state court had jurisdiction over this type of claim.207  
Then the Court short-circuited the state court’s jurisdictional argument by attacking 
its essential premise.  The States, the Court held, “do not bear the same relation to 
the United States that they do to foreign countries” or sister States.208  Indeed, the 
Supremacy Clause rejects this notion.  It essentially converts the federal laws into 
state laws.  That is, “[w]hen Congress . . . adopted th[is] act, it spoke for all the 
people and all the states . . . as if the act had emanated from [the States’] own 
legislature.”209  So to summarize, at this point the Court had effectively held (1) that 
the federal law is treated as if it was a state law; and (2) that the state court had 
“conceded” that it has jurisdiction over the state (and therefore the federal) claim.210 
Finally, the Court had to reject Justice Story’s second point, that the federal penal 
laws cannot be enforced in the State’s courts.  To do this, the Court turned to one of 
its prior decisions, which merely confirmed the States’ ability—but not their 
obligation—to adjudicate federal claims.211  The case was Claflin, where the Court 
held that if “an act of Congress give[s] a penalty to a party aggrieved . . . there is no 
reason why it should not be enforced . . . in a state court.”212 
At bottom, then, the Court never held that the States are obligated to enforce the 
federal laws.  Rather, the Court only held that a state judge could not substantively 
discriminate against a federal law, and that a federal penal law could be adjudicated 
in the States’ courts.  So for purposes of this article, the real holding in Testa is not 
much of a holding at all.  It merely reaffirms the Court’s holding in Claflin, that the 
“federal laws can[not] be considered by the states as though they were laws 
emanating from a foreign sovereign.”213  The Supremacy Clause already said that.  
Therefore, the importance of this case lies in the fact that the Court specifically 
avoided overruling its holding in the Pelican case, implying at least that Congress 
cannot require the States to exercise jurisdiction over any federal claim.  
                                                                
206See Robinson, 43 A.2d 467 (R.I. 1945). 
207See Testa, 330 U.S. at 394.  The Court actually placed this point at the end of its 
opinion. 
208Id. at 390. 
209See id. at 392. 
210Id. 
211See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).   
212Testa, 330 U.S. at 391 (quoting Claflin, 93 U.S. at 137). 
213Testa, 330 U.S. at 391. 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
528 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:497 
G.  Mr. Justice Holmes’s Jurisdictional Stopgap 
Up to this point, it seems clear that a federal jurisdictional grant is not a “law” 
within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, and that the Supreme Court has never 
required the States to exercise jurisdiction over any federal claim that was outside the 
scope of their States’ state-imposed jurisdictional duties.  All that remains is a 
coherent and consistent theory that supports this result—enter Mr. Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes.  The dissent in Alden welcomed his holding in Kawananakoa v. 
Polyblank214 with open arms, referring to it as a “logically impeccable theory” that 
no one could “escape from.” 215  Justice Holmes surely would have appreciated these 
compliments, but he would not have appreciated the dissent’s misreading of what he 
actually said in Kawananakoa.  
In that case, after mortgaging their property, the Kawananakoas conveyed a 
portion of their property to Damon, who in turn conveyed the property to the 
Territory of Hawaii.216  When the Kawananakoas defaulted, the mortgagee 
foreclosed on all of the property except the piece the Territory owned, bringing suit 
against the Kawananakoas for the deficiency.217  The Kawananakoas argued that they 
were only responsible for the deficiency that would persist after all the property was 
sold.  However, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii held that that would 
require “joining the Territory as a party defendant, and that cannot be done.”218 
Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed.  The correctness of the 
lower court’s holding, he philosophized, “has been public property since before the 
days of Hobbes.  A sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical 
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on 
which the right depends.”219  Since the Territory is itself the “fountain from which 
rights ordinarily flow,” if it says it is immune, it is immune.220 
Careful reflection reveals that Alden’s dissenters cannot escape Justice Holmes’s 
impeccable logic.  Now it is true, as the dissent pointed out, that he tied the source of 
the immunity to the law upon which it arose; and by way of example, he claimed that 
the District of Columbia would be subject to suit in the Circuit Court of the District 
of Columbia if a federal statute said so.221  However, that would be true even if a 
state law created the right of action upon which the suit in the Circuit Court of the 
District of Columbia was based.  This is because “there can be no legal right as 
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”222  The dissent 
                                                                
214205 U.S. 349 (1907). 
215See Alden, 527 U.S. at 798. 
216See Polyblank v. Kawananakoa, 1905 WL 1418, at * 1 (Haw. Terr. Oct. 23, 1905).  
217See id. 
218See Polyblank, 1905 WL 1418 at * 1. 
219Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353. 
220Id. at 353-54. 
221See Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 4, 11 (1889) (approvingly 
referred to in Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353, 354). 
222Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).  The precise meaning of this phrase 
is only discernible if you keep in mind that a “legal dut[y] is logically antecedent to [a] legal 
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assumed that what Justice Holmes meant by “law” was the common law or statute 
that created the mortgagee’s right to foreclose.  While erroneous, such an assumption 
is understandable. As the discussion thus far amply demonstrates, a “law” within the 
meaning of both the Supremacy Clause and Article III does not include jurisdictional 
grants.   
Justice Holmes, however, did not subscribe to such rigid formalities.  He looked 
at the law backwards.  To him, the “law” is a command that tells its recipient what 
they cannot do.223   As for the other side of the coin, i.e., the right, it is not always 
coextensive with the duty: 
To put it more broadly, and avoid the word duty, which is open to 
objection, the direct working of the law is to limit freedom of action or 
choice on the part of a greater or less number of persons in certain 
specified ways; while the power of removing or enforcing this limitation 
which is generally confided to certain other private persons, or, in other 
words, a right corresponding to the burden, is not a necessary or universal 
correlative.224   
Kawananakoa is a case in point.  If the Territory of Hawaii did not own a piece of 
the property at issue in this case, the landowner’s duty would extend as far as the 
mortgagee’s right.  The mortgagee would have a right to the property, and the owner 
would have a duty to give up the property.  But since the Territory was involved, the 
owners’ duty did not extend as far as the mortgagee’s rights.  The private owner was 
under a duty to give up the property but the Territory was not; we know this because 
the Territory’s right to retain possession of the property was essentially transformed 
into a duty imposed on the judge.  The judge was under a duty to deny the 
mortgagee’s right against the State; and this duty was the “law” Holmes was 
referring to in Kawananakoa.  Indeed, in his mind, a legal right was secondary, if not 
incidental, to the proper functioning of the judicial machine. 
Against this backdrop, one can see that Justice Holmes never said that “sovereign 
immunity may be invoked only by the sovereign that is the source of the right upon 
which suit is brought,” as the dissent stated.225   In fact, he specifically counseled 
against looking at the source of the right, as opposed to the source of the duty.226  The 
only relevant duty in Kawananakoa was whether the judge should immunize the 
Territory of Hawaii, and to determine that required looking at the source of the 
                                                          
right[].”  O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 173 (1881).  Thus considered, it is apparent 
that the right, being dependent on the “law,” only takes hold after a duty is imposed on the 
judge to adjudicate the right. 
223See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 42 168 (1881) (“[t]he purpose of criminal law is 
only to induce external conformity to rule . . . [l]aw, being a practical thing, must found itself 
on actual forces.”); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (“The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean 
by the law.”). 
224See id. at 173. 
225Alden, 527 U.S. at 796 (emphasis added). 
226See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 173-74 (1881) (stating that not all rights are 
created by the law, and that the law is best understood by looking at the back of its shield—
that is, by looking at its power to restrict persons from using their rights). 
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
530 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:497 
court’s existence, not the “source of the right upon which [the] suit [was] 
brought.”227 
With this distinction in mind, it thus becomes readily apparent why Justice 
Holmes believed a suit against the District of Columbia in the Circuit Court of the 
District of Columbia is different than a suit against the Territory of Hawaii in the 
Territory’s courts.228  Only a federal jurisdictional grant could (and did) bind the 
judge in the former case,229 whereas only a Territory of Hawaii jurisdictional grant 
could (and did) bind the judge in the latter case.230  The result would have been the 
same regardless of the fountains from which these private rights of action arose. 
H.  A Synthesis of the Jurisdictional Stopgap Model 
Federalism is a complicated mosaic.  It is perhaps the most elusive area of our 
law, especially in the arcane area of jurisdictional law.  Layer upon layer, the Court’s 
holdings tug at the consistent limits of the preceding layer; and when you throw the 
rich and eloquent history of the constitutional debates into the mix, you sometimes 
border on complete confusion.  This article has traveled across many of these mine 
fields, not through the Framer’s eyes, but through the Court’s holdings that have 
crystallized since then.  In the process, an odd basic consequent has emerged: the 
Constitution does indeed strike a state-federal balance.  Both spheres retain “a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty,”231 yet there will unavoidably be some overlap.  
The simple solution, and the one the Framers no doubt envisioned, is compromise.  
Congress’s Commerce Power extends into virtually every crevice.  The Framers may 
not have envisioned that result, but the animal cannot be caged.  Only common 
sense—not hollow formulas—can do that, and the best proxy for common sense is 
self interest vis-a-vis the national and state political processes.  
The States’ however have plenary power over the jurisdiction of their judiciary. 
The Framers must have envisioned that, for they gave Congress the ability to 
establish inferior federal courts should the States resist.232  Justice Holmes must have 
seen this jurisdictional stopgap, for it is evident in his view of the law:  law is a 
command; rights are a necessary by-product; and sometimes the power that 
commands retains some of these rights.  This is the case in the law of jurisdiction.  
The courts are dependents, mere appendages, of their sovereign, and as such they 
may be destroyed should they refuse “to submit themselves” to their sovereign.233  
This is the “public property” Justice Holmes and Hobbes were both well aware of.  
Jurisdiction, in other words, is an all or nothing proposition.  It can only arise from 
                                                                
227Id. 
228See Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 4, 11 (1889) (approvingly 
referred to in Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353, 354). 
229See Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 11 (1889). 
230See Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 354. 
231THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (Alexander Hamilton).  
232See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
233HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), reprinted in LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD AND MICHAEL 
FREEMAN, LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 151-52 (5th ed. 1985). 
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the source of its creation, and thus it is “incapable of receiving” the judicial power 
from any other source.  
And so it is.  Congress may regulate interstate commerce to practically no end, 
and it can, nay it must, provide a forum for the vindication of these rights.  Although 
a citizen may not necessarily bring a federal action against a State in federal court, 
the federal government no doubt can.  The Supreme Court has never said otherwise.  
But bringing these actions is not cheap, nor should they be.  The federal government, 
after all, is effectively coercing the States to submit to its regulatory policy—a policy 
over which the States may not agree; because if they did, they would have consented 
to the suit in the first place.  As for the remaining federal claims, i.e. those against 
private citizens, the federal doors open up without the assistance of the Executive 
Branch.  These claims, while infringing on the State’s interstitial role as regulator, 
are only coercive in the negative sense—that is, they may prohibit the States from 
occupying the field.  The States may of course disagree with these laws, and 
accordingly close their doors.234  Should that happen, the drain on (and thus the 
continued expansion of) the federal judiciary may be significant.  But it should be.  If 
all of the States disagree with the federal law, it just might be a bad idea.  To coerce 
the States into enforcing a law they disagree with is to encourage its de facto 
nullification.  Most of the state judges, after all, are elected.  Moreover, to require 
state judges to do that which their very existence is against unquestionably 
constitutes a failing in the state political process, not to mention a drain on the other 
laboratory experiments that may be brewing.235 
Simply because the federal government cannot coerce the state courts directly, 
however, does not mean that it cannot effectively do so indirectly.  It can accomplish 
its desired result by persuading State legislatures to open up the jurisdiction of their 
courts to accommodate a federal claim.  Once the state courts have jurisdiction over 
the matter, they then cannot refuse to hear the claim, regardless of the existence of an 
analogous state law claim.236  
I.  Conclusion 
The Supreme Court tried to save the State’s sovereignty by caging the Commerce 
Power.  That cannot be done, as National League of Cities woefully demonstrates.  
So this time, instead of delimiting the reach of the Commerce Clause, the Court 
pared back Congress’s ability to abrogate the States’ immunity from certain suits 
filed in the federal courts. This was entirely proper because the very existence of the 
federal judiciary is dependent on the federal government, though the Supreme Court, 
unlike the state courts, has the power to define its own jurisdiction within the limits 
                                                                
234It may appear that this jurisdictional stopgap essentially swallows Mondou’s 
discrimination model.  It doesn’t.  Mondou specifically dealt with the court’s discrimination, 
not the state legislature.  The States can discriminate all they want, but they won’t if what the 
federal government has to offer is in accord with what the States’ constituents want.   
235For an excellent discussion of the economics for and against a strong and weak federal 
government, see SHAPIRO, supra note 64, at 34-44, 75-91, 118-31 (1995). 
236The requirement that there be an analogous state law claim is really just a circuitous 
way of saying that the state court has jurisdiction. 
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of Article III.237  The Supreme Court simultaneously reinvigorated cooperative 
federalism by rejecting Congress’s ability to coerce and commandeer the legislative 
and executive branches.  Finally, the Court recognized that the States are at least as 
immune from suit in their own courts as they are from suit in the federal courts.  
Now all that remains is for the Supreme Court to recognize the last turn in Justice 
Holmes’s constitutionally crooked path and begin to move to the measure of his 
thoughts. 
                                                                
237That is, the federal judicial power (or at least a large portion of it) must be vested in 
some court.  And if the state courts do not have jurisdiction, and if Congress does not confer 
that jurisdiction, then the Court must either insist that the inferior federal courts exercise that 
jurisdiction or the Court itself must exercise original jurisdiction over the matter.  If there are 
no inferior federal courts, only the last alternative remains available, as the Court clearly 
cannot require Congress to create the inferior courts, for that would be an exercise over the 
purse. 
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